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1. Overall objectives of the structural reform 
On the basis of some of the findings of the Liikanen report on the EU banking sector (2012),1 
on 29 January 2014 the European Commission (EC) adopted a proposal for a regulation to 
address the risks of complex business models combining retail and investment banking 
activities. Within these new rules, supervisors will be granted the power to forbid 
proprietary trading and to require the separation of other trading activities (such as ‘market 
making’) from traditional commercial and retail banking activities. If adopted by the 
European Parliament (most likely this autumn) and the EU Council, the new regulation on 
the structure of banking could be the last significant piece of regulation of the Commission’s 
extensive reform agenda for financial services.  
There are two main objectives behind this proposal. On one hand, structural reform aims to 
enhance financial stability (the financial stability objective); on the other hand, the separation 
between high-risk trading activities and retail activities should be designed so as to support 
economic growth, by promoting lending to the real economy (the economic efficiency objective).   
Financial stability objective  
The explicit objective behind the proposal for structural reform of the EU banking union is to 
strengthen the stability of the financial system as a whole, notably by lessening the harmful 
effects of the ‘Too big to fail (TBTF)’ or ‘Too connected to fail (TCTF)’ status of some banks in 
the European Union. According to that theory, which was supported by numerous academic 
contributions,2 TBTF and TCTF banks have high incentives for risk-taking, owing to the 
guarantee of a state intervention in the event of a financial bankruptcy.3 This ‘implicit 
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1 Published in October 2012, this report was prepared by the High-level Expert Group on reforming 
the structure of the EU banking sector. The Group chaired by Erkki Liikanen was established by the 
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2 See Gertler et al. (2012) and Fahri et al. (2012).   
3 The setup of the Single Bank Resolution Fund should help break sovereign-bank nexus; however, 
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subsidy’ leads TBTF and TCTF banks (including some deposit-taking banks) to engage in 
high-risk activities, which pose significant threats to overall financial stability. 
As a consequence, the separation of high-risk activities from low-risk activities is expected to 
concern only the systemically important European banks and the entities with significant 
trading activities (according to early estimates, the new regulation will apply to around 29 
European banks).4 Supervisors will have better control over the overall financial risks taken 
by TBTF and TCTF banks by performing an annual examination of the trading activities that 
could trigger the separation.5  
If they judged it necessary, supervisors can require banks to transfer their high-risk trading 
activities to separate legal entities within the group (subsidiarisation).6 By reducing 
interconnectedness between banking segments when needed, regulators will be able to limit 
the channels of financial crisis transmission, leading to downside systemic risks in the 
financial sector. 
Economic efficiency objective 
The second objective is to support economic growth by trying to refocus the main activity of 
largest banks on supporting the real economy and serving consumers. Regulators will 
further encourage large banks to adjust their balance sheets towards lending to the real 
economy rather than towards intra-financial-sector borrowing and lending (see Figure 1 and 
Figure 2). As such, the structural reform should help repair the damage to potential output 
caused by the financial crisis. 
 
Figure 1. Total loans and advances                                   Figure 2. Financial assets held for trading    
(as % of total assets, 2013)                                                (as % of total assets, 2013)   
                
Source: ECB consolidated banking data.                                          Source: ECB consolidated banking data. 
 
                                                     
4 Metrics and thresholds to determine the scope of banks will be defined later on by delegated acts. 
5 As stated in the impact assessment, a special focus will be placed on deposit-taking banks to ensure 
that these banks “are not unduly influenced by a short-term trading culture”. 
6 Should the option ‘subsidiarisation’ be chosen, the separation will mean that the trading entity and 
the retail entity will have to maintain self-standing reserves of capital and of loss-absorbing debt, as 
well as to comply with other prudential and legal requirements on an individual, sub-consolidated or 
consolidated basis. 
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2. Impact on household retail finance 
Much has been written about the possible effects of the three main structural reforms 
(inspired by Volckers, Vickers and Liikanen) on the whole banking sector, but by considering 
only retail activities few studies comment the impact. Given that safer and more efficient 
retail activities are one of the main concerns behind the structural reform, an approach based 
exclusively on household retail activities can help to fine-tune the priorities of future macro-
prudential policies.  
Positive effects 
Regarding the objective of a safer banking system, the separation between the capital 
supporting trading activities and the capital funding core retail services will help alleviate 
damaging contagion within banking organisations (Vickers, 2012). Owing to the separation, 
deposit-taking businesses will be better protected from adverse financial events occurring in 
trading activities.   
In addition, the structural reform should improve the resolvability of retail banks in the 
event of failure. By lowering the complexity of the business models of largest banks, 
supervisors will be more able to reduce resolution costs of retail activities. However, cross-
border resolution regimes need to be sufficiently harmonised for an efficient resolution of 
international retail banks. This may improve with the implementation of the EU’s Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) by early 2016. 
Economic efficiency is likely to be enhanced through a common EU legislative framework 
regarding the structural reform and decreased incentives of the larger banks to take risks.  
Many of the banks within the scope of the structural reform operate large household retail 
activities across borders and typically have economic interests in different EU domestic 
markets. A common legislative framework on structural reform should help these banks to 
expand their retail activities across the EU, since it should notably increase the effectiveness 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
Finally, as incentives of the largest banks for risk taking are expected to decrease, the 
insolvency risks of largest banks and the number of ensuing bail-ins will most likely 
decrease, resulting in fewer fiscal shocks on states and household balance sheets: household 
disposable income should therefore be more stable. In this context, it can be argued that 
private consumption and household investment will be less volatile and the demand for 
retail financial products, such as mortgage and consumption credits, should be more 
resilient. As such, the structural reform of the banking system should indirectly contribute to 
more dynamic retail banking activities.7  
Negative effects 
The implementation of the structural reform could trigger several effects, directly or 
indirectly damaging the stability of household retail activities. 
Decreasing diversification as a result of separation could noticeably increase the risk of retail 
banks’ bankruptcy.8 In a specific context, a separate domestic retail bank would fail (for 
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example, because of a domestic property market crash), while it could have survived if it had 
been part of a banking group with wider geographical and/or functional scope (Vickers, 
2012).  
Furthermore, already existing systemic risks could be simply transferred and not reduced, 
because targeted banks could shift some of their businesses towards less regulated and 
supervised markets in order to alleviate their regulatory costs. Some of these market 
migrations could even increase systemic risks, especially when markets migrate to spheres 
with very low supervision and control (FTI, 2014). All banking activities, including 
household retail financial services, could eventually be affected by global upside systemic 
risk. 
Finally, retail banks may still remain subject to some reputational risk and group contagion: 
the failure of a trading subsidiary could potentially lead to a loss of confidence in the whole 
group. The structural reform admittedly did not aim to alleviate reputational risk; 
nevertheless, this persistent channel of financial crisis transmission is likely to impede the 
objective of financial stability.  
On the other hand, the expected positive effect on economic efficiency could be partially 
undermined by significant implementation costs and higher borrowing costs for households. 
Targeted banks will have to face the reorganisation of their trading activities and technical 
difficulties to integrate the new piece of legislation within the ongoing large-scale regulatory 
implementation. In addition, further costs will be sparked by the substantial compliance and 
reporting requirements (Chow et al., 2013). Overall, all these new costs would imply a 
reallocation of resources, which could be detrimental to numerous banking activities, notably 
retail household finance. 
Secondly, if the proposal were to be accepted in the EU, interest rates of retail loans to 
households could be on the upside for two main reasons: the decreasing diversification of 
the funding base of banks and scarcer liquidity.  
As a consequence of the separation of trading business from retail activities, diversification 
of the funding base of the targeted banks would probably drop, potentially resulting in an 
inappropriate distribution of exposures to borrowers and higher-than-optimal concentration 
risk. There could therefore be a risk of greater volatility in revenues, which could imply, if 
properly priced, higher average funding costs for banks. Under the assumption of significant 
pass-through, interest rates on household retail loans would increase. 
Furthermore, ensuring continuous liquidity is likely to be more challenging for large banks, 
given the new restrictions on trading activities and the progressive implementation of the 
price-based regulations reforms such as the liquidity ratios. As a result, funding costs could 
be on the upside, which might also raise the borrowing costs of households.  
Finally, the implementation of the structural reform could weaken the sales business model 
of universal banks, whose main strength is to offer multiple financial services almost 
simultaneously (concept of ‘one-stop-shopping’). However, this characteristic of universal 
banks primarily concerns specific banking segments, such as private banking and corporate 
finance for large non-financial corporations (especially large multi-national companies, 
whose specific needs can involve a vast range of financial services), and has few links with 
household retail finance. 
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3. Recommendations 
If it is implemented, the banking structural reform should reinforce the stability and 
economic efficiency of household retail activities through lower contagion, better 
resolvability in the event of failure, more harmonised supervisory practices across the EU 
and more resilient household demand for retail loans. However, it could also trigger 
counterproductive effects that could partly undermine the expected benefits. These potential 
negative effects are not appropriately assessed in the impact study of the proposal published 
in January 2014 and will require further consideration in the coming months.  
In particular, more emphasis should be placed on the following: 
Financial stability objective  
  
 bankruptcy risks of retail banks;  
 transfer of existing systemic activities towards less regulated and supervised markets; 
 reputational risk; 
 
Economic efficiency objective 
 
 implementation costs; 
 borrowing costs for households (impacted by the decreasing diversification of the 
funding base of banks and scarcer liquidity). 
 
A thorough analysis of these five channels could help fine-tune the priorities of future 
macro-prudential policies and help regulators to achieve the objectives of safer and more 
efficient retail activities. 
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